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Political opportunity theorists (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; and Tarrow 
1989, among others) have pointed to the fact that the strategies adopted 
by social movements are contextual and that they are to a considerable 
extent determined by the prevailing political system and by the opportuni-
ties that present themselves for social mobilization. According to Meyer, 
‘the organisation of the polity and the positioning of various  actors within 
it makes some strategies of influence more attractive and potentially 
effica cious than others. The wisdom, creativity, and outcomes of activ-
ists’ choices – their agency – can only be understood and evaluated by 
looking at the political context and the rules of the game in which those 
choices are made – that is structure’ (Meyer 2004: 129). At the same time, 
resource mobilization approaches have pointed out that while agency 
is central to the success of social movements, so too are the material, 
organizational and intellectual resources at their disposal (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977). Evidence of this reality is to be found in the burgeoning 
social mobilization under way in post-apartheid South Africa. As will be 
seen, however, what differentiates this type of collective action, common 
in some states in the South, is the fact that it has, for many poor and 
disadvantaged communities, become a normalized mode of engagement 
with the state over basic socio-economic rights rather than, as is more 
often the case in the North, the practice of specific interest groups. What 
the case studies that follow amply illustrate is the fact that the prevailing 
political opportunity structures in South Africa are such that resource-
deprived communities have little option but to take to the streets in their 
struggle to achieve their rights as citizens. 
The upsurge in social protest activity in South Africa during the second 
decade of its new democracy is reflective of the extent to which formal 
institutional channels for citizen engagement with the state have failed. 
Indicative of the scale of this trend, some six thousand protests were offi-
cially recorded during the 2004/05 financial year and an estimated fifteen 
protests were being held per day somewhere in South Africa during 2007 
(Delaney 2007). The reasons for this failure are extensive and have been 
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discussed elsewhere at length and from a variety of different theoretical 
perspectives (Bond 2000; Terreblanche 2002; Daniel et al. 2005; Ballard 
et al. 2006; Tapscott 2008; and Piper and Deacon 2008, among others). 
Most authors concur that while frustration with the slow pace of service 
delivery and job creation are the proximate stimuli for this protest action, 
an ensemble of mutually reinforcing factors has given rise to this state 
of affairs and serves to inhibit the substantive participation of the poor 
in democratic institutions and processes. Despite the fact that the 1996 
constitution and a plethora of policies emanating from that founding 
document have created an enabling framework for participation, the 
institutions and processes set in place to engage citizens in this pro cess, 
the ‘invited spaces’, have not yielded returns in the form of service delivery 
(houses, water, electricity, etc.) or job creation. In large part this is due 
to the fact that the state has set the parameters for engagement in these 
forums, and has arrogated to itself the right to determine when, how and 
to whom services are allocated.
While most states presume the right to determine what constitutes 
the public good, in more consolidated democracies this practice is medi-
ated, to a greater or lesser extent, by the interventions of civil society in 
the form of opposition parties, the media and other interest groups. In 
developing states, where civil society is weak, the dominance of the state 
tends to be aggravated by the political character of the ruling elites. In 
that respect, a feature of the process of democratic consolidation that has 
taken place in South Africa since 1994 has been the uneven mutation of 
the ruling African National Congress (ANC) from a liberation movement 
to a more formal political power in office. Having swept into office on 
the tide of popular resistance, the incoming ANC government effectively 
brought the notion of participation into the political and theoretical 
mainstream and raised it to a first principle of government policy. It is 
evident, however, that politically the ANC still perceives itself to be the 
vanguard of popular struggles and, in so doing, it crowds out attempts by 
other social movements to represent popular aspirations. In this context, 
the independent mobilization of citizens on even the most mundane of 
matters is perceived to be a threat to the status of elected officials and 
a direct challenge to the party as a whole.
Faced with the reality that the state is generally unresponsive to de-
mands raised through formal institutional channels, disaffected citizens 
and the organizations that represent them have increasingly sought alter-
native means to express their grievances. The channels chosen have varied 
from community to community, according to their social, economic and 
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political contexts, and they have differed in their effectiveness in extract-
ing concessions from the state. In essence, nevertheless, these social 
movements are challenging the hegemony of the state exercised through 
formally designated sites of participation (including ward committees, 
public meetings – imbizos – and local elections) and are insisting that their 
concerns be addressed directly and as a matter of urgency. In eschewing 
formal channels, furthermore, the options that present themselves for 
redress are several: to embark on protest action (peaceful, violent or a 
combination of both) or alternatively to pursue their rights through the 
courts.
While the resort to violent protest holds the potential to evolve over 
time into a revolutionary movement with the further potential to over-
throw the state, it is evident that this is not the intention of most social 
movements in South Africa.' Furthermore, while a significant number 
of service delivery protests have turned violent, there is little evidence to 
suggest, at the level of individual communities at least, that this form of 
engagement with the state has yielded any particular gains. Typically, the 
state has responded with force and has portrayed these struggles as the 
work of thugs and criminals, thus delegitimizing them in the public eye. 
This response is typified in a statement by the premier of the Western 
Cape province following protest action in one of Cape Town’s informal 
settlements.
I am warning that in no way should our sympathy for grievances around 
housing, services and amenities be interpreted as condoning illegal 
actions. The police will have no option but to restore order and only then 
can government enter into discussions around the problems of  housing, 
services and amenities. … [W]e will not be held hostage to burning 
barri cades and illegal marches. I appeal to those at the forefront of these 
actions to much rather use the legitimate democratic institutions such 
as the many Imbizos, the ward committees, the structures for social 
dialogue and the offices of local councillors and MPs to present their 
case. If they choose not to do so, then they must face the consequences 
of a government determined to protect the interests of all its citizens. 
(Rasool 2005)
For most citizens, therefore, formal political structures, peaceful 
demon strations and a recourse to litigation remain the only channels 
open for the attainment of rights.
The constitution and the legal framework to which it gave rise, how-
ever, are based on normative Western ideals of citizenship. Thus the 
